History, Science or Art?
Shina Alimi
The question whether history is a science or art is a relatively recent one which can hardly be traced further than 19th century. Through out the century, it was not uncommon to hear the German scholars frequently referred to historical science when they meant no more than the idea of systematic intellectual discipline. They argued, one was being scientific if one aspired to arrive at the highest degree of objectivity in pursuance of dependable solution to problem. What then is science? What does historian investigate? What relationship exists between history and science?
W. H. Walsh has defined science as “a body of knowledge acquired as the result of an attempt to study a certain subject-matter in a methodical way following a determinate set of principles.” From the foregoing, it could be inferred that a science is a body of systematically related knowledge arranged in an orderly manner. For anybody of knowledge to be scientific, it is argued, it must possess the following features: methodology; generalization; and predictability.
Although historians do not have among themselves mutually recognized set of explanatory tools or methodology as the natural scientists who possess universally acceptable language that cut across national borders, this does not mean the absence of coherent method of investigation. The hypotheses and presupposition which form the basis of scientific explanation have to be mutually intelligent to the global community of scientists for them to be considered as valid tools of explanation. Nevertheless, historians make use of hypotheses. E.H. Carr asserts “the division of history into periods is not a fact but a necessary hypothesis or tool of thought, valid in so far as it is illuminating and dependent for its validity on interpretation.” Secondly, the division of history into geographical sector is hypothetical.
It is frequently argued that history is only concerned with individual and unique events while science with universal and general. This is the question of generalization. History, unlike natural science where theories and generalized statement are made, is concerned with unique events in the past. Moreover, historians deal with object (man) with dynamic behaviour and reasoning. Not only that, human beings are more difficult to predict than operative factors in the natural world because natural objects even when they have life, they do not possess self-consciousness and therefore much easier to study. The attempt in sociology to make universal study of man has not been a total success as the practitioners have failed to develop a Grand Theory or immutable law like the natural scientists. Even in natural science, the operation of laws is based on conditions which any changing there of will alter its workability.
But it should be noted that generalization is not foreign to history. In fact, the very use of names and language commits historians, like the scientists to generalization. For instance, historians talk about World War, yet many battles were fought within this war.
E.H. Carr argues “the historian is not really interested in the unique, but in what is general in the unique…the historian constantly uses generalization to test his evidence.” What actually distinguishes historian’s generalization from that of natural scientist is that, the former arrives at his generalization through comparative analysis of two or more unique events without formulating law and his conclusion is always tentative, the latter having uniquely studied his object (what he calls a case study) generalize and formulate law which he expects to apply in all places and at all time.
Closely linked with the problem of generalization is the question of prediction. Scientific study is always concluded with prediction. Forecast is not the task of historian. History does not deal with unforeseeable future but with significant events as concerned man in the past. Prediction also becomes very difficult because the object of study in history, man, is both dynamic with time and space. Several efforts to radically imitate the natural scientific methodology by some historians, popularly known as the “Positivists” have disappointedly failed. The Marxist interpretation of history which has once gained currency also failed in respect to prediction. But it should be noted that even though law formulation is impossible in history, an understanding of the trends of past events is a necessary guide to the present and compass to the future. Even the so-called laws of science are statements of tendency and probability. That rain falls immediately after the gathering of cloud in the sky does not mean that rain must fall every time cloud gathers. The conclusion so formed by historian is not generalization as such but tentative inferences which requires no popularization as in natural science.
Although historian can draw on the fruitful idea of scientific hypothesis, no historian can feel confident to present the same resounding result as the natural scientists or competes favourably with them in predicting future except in relatively limited and specialized area of inquiry; neither could historian in his serious efforts to present objective past re-enact the extant past like the scientists do with their experiment objects. Even if historian has all archival material on the Agbekoya crisis for instance, neither can he resurrect the war actors or the war itself, for the past is thoroughly dead and the future yet unborn.
Moreover, the problem and disagreement among natural scientists are not as insoluble as among historians. For instance, it is much easier for any superior opinion or theory to provide a more comprehensive explanation and consequently supersedes the outdated theory and the scientist of the outdated theory is easily persuaded by sheer force of argument based on the universally acceptable scientific laws and procedures of enquiry. This is not always so in historical enquiry as objectivity itself is relative for historians. Not only that, historical enquiry, except events of relatively past, makes use of second hand evidences. Even documentary evidences that are classified primary are not strictly speaking primary because these commentary and reports were compiled by other people who inevitably would have selected the issues and facts of importance to them and which they considered relevant to their account.
In conclusion, historians are not expected to be parochial or over-conservative in their business. The adoption of inter-disciplinary approach will definitely enhance historical enquiry. The use of scientific methodology could also complement historical methodology. Also, historians could make use of conceptual framework to organize and effectively guide their work, although care must be taken to avoid ideological prejudice.
References
1. Olorunfemi, A., The Problems of Historical Understanding, Inaugural Lecture Series 194. Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU) Ile-Ife,2006.
2. Collingwood, R.G., The Idea of History, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
3. Carr, E.H., What is History? London: Macmillan, 1989.
4. Aziz, T.M., The meaning of History: An Islamic Perspective. Google Search Engine, nd.
5. Walsh, W.H., An Introduction to Philosophy of History, London: Hutchinson , University Library, 1967 edn.
6. Elton,G.R.,(with Evans, J.R.) The Practice of History,2nd,Edition, London: Blackwells Publishing Incorporated, 2001.
7. Marwick, A., The Nature of History, London: Macmillan, 1984.
8. Hegel,W.F.G., (Translated by Siberee, J.), The Philosophy of History, Google S,earch Engine, np. nd.
9. Mark Bevir, Objectivity in History, University of California Berkeley, Postprints, 1994, Paper1099.
No comments:
Post a Comment